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SAGE uses a set of assumptions called the ‘reasonable worst-case
scenario’ in its pandemic planning. Jonathan Birch (LSE) looks at the
group’s minutes and documents from early 2020 and argues that over-
reliance on these assumptions led to costly delays.
What unfolded in the UK in the spring of 2020 was a national tragedy
within the global tragedy of COVID-19. The course the epidemic took was
not inevitable: it was affected by policy choices made in a state of severe
19/01/2021 Science and policy in extremis: what can we learn from the UK's initial response to COVID-19? | LSE COVID-19
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/12/16/science-and-policy-in-extremis-what-can-we-learn-from-the-uks-initial-response-to-covid-19/ 2/13
uncertainty. Can we learn from the way those decisions were made to
develop better norms for scienti c advising in extremis?
The advisory process in the UK has been impressively transparent. In
particular, SAGE (the Scienti c Advisory Group for Emergencies) has
published minutes and other documents soon after its meetings. This
gives us a rich set of resources on which to draw. In a draft paper, I
discuss several issues arising from these minutes. Here, I want to zoom in
on one speci c issue: the role played by “reasonable worst-case
scenarios” in strategic planning.
The reasonable worst-case
scenario
The “reasonable worst-case scenario” (RWCS) has been at the core of
SAGE’s approach to the pandemic from the beginning. An RWCS is a set
of assumptions that re ect one way in which the epidemic in the UK may
unfold. The set of assumptions is “reasonable” in the sense of being
regarded by SAGE as a serious possibility. It is “worst-case” in the sense
of being at the pessimistic end of the range of serious possibilities.
The implicit principle behind the use of RWCSs seems to be this: if you
assume you are in the RWCS, and plan accordingly, then you will be as
well prepared as possible for less severe scenarios.
What was the RWCS that guided the UK’s initial response to COVID-19? It
was, in some respects, truly grim. SAGE’s RWCS planning assumptions,
dated 6 March, set out a scenario in which 80% of the population gets
COVID-19 over a period of about nine weeks, with 50% displaying
symptoms, and an infection fatality rate (IFR) of 1%. The result would have
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been around 520,000 excess deaths within three months. In an earlier
draft dated 4 March, there is an explicit assumption that no effective
treatments or vaccines will become available either before or during the
epidemic. This line is deleted from the version dated 6 March, but seems
to tacitly guide strategic planning.
Boris Johnson at a meeting about COVID-19 at No 10 on 14 March 2020.
Photo: Number 10 via a CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 licence
SAGE also made some background assumptions that, while not formally
part of the RWCS, are important for understanding it. First, SAGE assumed
that contact tracing would cease to be effective once there were more
than 50 cases per week. Second, SAGE appears to have assumed that, as
a realistic maximum, interventions (such as social distancing and
shielding) could be sustained for 13 weeks. Some modelling was done of
a scenario in which they are sustained for 26 weeks, but 13 weeks is the
assumption in the summary papers produced by SAGE. Third, SAGE
assumed partial compliance. For example, it was assumed that 50% will
comply with household quarantine. This is described in a 3 March paper
as “high levels of compliance”.
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Yet in other respects, the RWCS assumptions are excessively optimistic.
SAGE (in the 4 March draft) assumes that R , the basic reproductive rate
of the virus in the absence of mitigation, is 2.4, leading to a doubling time
of 4-6 days. Estimates varied a great deal at the time, and still do, but this
was, even then, towards the lower end of serious estimates for R .
A study published in The Lancet on 31 January had estimated R  at 2.7.
On 11 February, researchers at the Theoretical Biology and Biophysics unit
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA, released a preprint
estimating that R  was between 4.7 and 6.6.
There was another optimistic background assumption, introduced on 25
February, that surveillance “should provide evidence of an epidemic
around 9-11 weeks before its peak”. Just as R  being higher than expected
was not part of the RWCS, surveillance being poorer than expected was
also not part of the RWCS. In short, the planning assumptions at this time
were a mix of bleak pessimism and excessive optimism.
Consequences
What were the consequences of these choices? The costly delays
between 2 March and 23 March, when cumulative infections in England
surged from about 13,500 to about 1.6m (to use the latest MRC-BSU
estimates), can be seen as consequences of planning assumptions made
around the beginning of this period. The combination of an optimistic
estimate for R , optimism about surveillance, and an assumption that 13
weeks was a realistic maximum duration for any intervention, made it
seem optimal to delay the introduction of social-behavioural interventions
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This problem was compounded by continued scepticism, up to 16 March,
about the idea of maximally aggressive suppression. For a time, SAGE’s
advice was explicitly against maximally aggressive suppression and in
favour of more moderate measures. There was a lot of talk in the media,
in early March, about “herd immunity”. SAGE was perceived by its critics to
be following a “herd immunity strategy”. The Chief Scienti c Adviser (Sir
Patrick Vallance) vehemently denied that there was any such strategy in
private emails subsequently released to the BBC.
What was really going on? The reality is clear from the documents
released by SAGE. Up to 9 March, there was no explicitly recommended
strategy. SAGE presented various different options, without formally
endorsing one. The recommended strategy between 9 and 16 March was
a “high transmission reduction strategy” in the sense of Figure 1: a
strategy which aimed to  atten the curve without suppressing it
completely. In the week of 16 March, the recommendation changed
abruptly to one of maximally aggressive suppression, including school
closures.
Figure 1: A sketch that features prominently in a paper dated 9 March,
intended to highlight the superiority of “high transmission reduction” to
“very high transmission reduction, later lifted”.
19/01/2021 Science and policy in extremis: what can we learn from the UK's initial response to COVID-19? | LSE COVID-19
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/12/16/science-and-policy-in-extremis-what-can-we-learn-from-the-uks-initial-response-to-covid-19/ 6/13
This initially sceptical attitude towards maximally aggressive suppression
can be traced back to the RWCS planning assumptions. In a reasonable
worst-case, no effective treatment, contact tracing system or vaccine
becomes available before measures are relaxed, and no long-term
behavioural changes are instilled, so total suppression leads robustly to
the epidemic returning with unmitigated force in the autumn, infecting
80% of the population and overwhelming the health service. This
corresponds to the green line in Figure 1. In that bleak scenario, we come
to bitterly regret the aggressive measures adopted in the spring.
In the actual world, by contrast, we have been left bitterly regretting our
failure to take these measures soon enough. If SAGE had unambiguously
recommended maximally aggressive suppression (including school
closures) on 2 March, when its SPI-M subcommittee  rst reported that “It
is highly likely that there is sustained transmission of COVID-19 in the UK
at present”, then many lives would have been saved and the epidemic
would have taken a different course.
Re ections
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Let’s return to the implicit principle guiding the use of RWCSs: if you
assume you are in the RWCS, and plan accordingly, then you will be as
well prepared as possible for less severe scenarios. This case, I suggest,
shows us some important exceptions to this principle.
The principle is not true if your RWCS is pessimistic in most relevant
respects but not all of them. I will introduce the term “globally pessimistic”
for a scenario that is pessimistic in all relevant respects. If the RWCS is
not globally pessimistic (e.g. its estimate for R  is too optimistic), then
there is a serious risk that reality will be worse than the RWCS in some
respects. This is what happened in relation to R, which was almost
certainly above 2.4 before the spring lockdown in England, according to
more recent MRC-BSU modelling, despite substantial attempts at
mitigation.
Of course, a globally pessimistic scenario may well seem unreasonable. It
is tempting to think: it is very unlikely that we will be unlucky in all
respects! This brings out a tension in the concept of an RWCS. To avoid
reality catching you out, the RWCS must be globally pessimistic, and may
therefore look unreasonable when viewed as a whole. But what matters is
that each individual assumption represents a serious possibility.
More subtly, there can be circumstances in which assuming you are in the
RWCS justi es actions, delays, or omissions that will impair your response
signi cantly if you are in a less severe scenario.
For example, it makes sense to say that, in a reasonable worst case, no
effective treatment or vaccine will become available, contact tracing will
never become effective, and no long-term behavioural changes will be
instilled, even if you delay the epidemic by several months. In this case,
maximally aggressive suppression of transmission is likely to make things
worse in the long run, as depicted in Figure 1.
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But suppose you are in a less severe scenario, in which one or more of
these pessimistic assumptions is false. In such a scenario, maximally
aggressive suppression is likely to be far superior to more moderate
action, in terms of both its public health consequences and its long-term
economic consequences. If you plan for the RWCS, and are thereby led to
adopt a strategy that involves aiming for the brown/orange line in Figure 1,
you will not be as well prepared as possible for a less severe scenario.
Proposals
This leads me to some proposals concerning the use of RWCSs in
scienti c advice. First: RWCSs, if used in any form of planning, should be
globally pessimistic, which is to say at the pessimistic end of scienti c
opinion in all potentially relevant respects, not just some.
Second, although they are a useful guide for day-to-day operational
planning (e.g. how many pieces of PPE to purchase), RWCSs should not
dominate strategic planning. For strategic planning, it is important to
consider a wide range of possible scenarios, including but not limited to
the reasonable worst case (which, if globally pessimistic, will be unlikely).
The apparent inevitability of a large wave as soon as measures were
relaxed was sensitive to a speci c set of worst-case planning
assumptions, which assumed that measures could not be sustained until
an effective treatment, vaccine, or contact tracing system was
implemented. These assumptions dominated strategic planning up to 16
March.
Yet as soon as modellers dared to relax one of those pessimistic
assumptions, the strategic picture suddenly changed. A paper by
modellers at Imperial College, dated 16 March, considered the possibility
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of maintaining maximally aggressive suppression measures (including
long periods of school closure) inde nitely, until a vaccine is achieved
(Figure 2). The paper concludes, dramatically, that aggressive suppression
is “the only viable strategy at the current time”. This paper produced a
swift change in the direction of the UK’s response.
Figure 2: A graph from Ferguson et al. (2020), in which aggressive
suppression measures are maintained inde nitely. The blue-outlined
blocks represent periods of school closure.
This leads me to another proposal: scienti c advisers should highlight, as
part of their advice, the circumstances under which their recommended
actions might lead to serious regret. When SAGE recommended a “high
transmission reduction” strategy over maximally aggressive suppression
on 9 March, it should have highlighted the potential for this strategy to
lead to serious regret—in the form of tens of thousands of excess deaths
which could, in retrospect, have been prevented by pursuing a more
aggressive suppression strategy at an earlier stage.
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These three proposals (make the RWCS globally pessimistic, do not allow
it to dominate strategic planning, and communicate the circumstances
under which recommendations arising from it may lead to serious regret)
are not a recipe for effective scienti c advising. A lot can still go wrong.
But I do think they would have helped in this case – and might help in
future crises on a similar scale.
This post represents the views of the author and not those of the COVID-
19 blog, nor LSE.
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